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"Despite a marsive infusion oj monty and manpower, no one can seriously claim that the 
war on drugs in Bolivia is being won. » 
Bolivia: The Politics of Cocaine 
By MELVIN BURKE 
Professor of Economics, University of Maine 
BOLIVIA'S sad and turbulent history continues . to repeat itself. The coca boom of today has replaced the tin boom of the last century, 
which in turn supplanted the exploitation of silver 
and other precious metals during the colonial 
period. And as in the past, Bolivia's export-based 
economy continues to depend on foreigners for 
everything from bank loans to economic advisers. 
It is impossible to understand Bolivia's current 
economic situation without first understanding the 
links between Bolivia's prosperity during the 1970's 
and the inflation, price stabilization and stagnation 
of the 1980's. The economic prosperity Bolivia en-
joyed during General Hugo Banzer Suarez's reign 
between 1971 and 1978 was financed with petrodol-
lars borrowed from abroad. In less than a decade, 
public debt increased from $671 million to more 
than $2.5 billion. Foreign loans were supplemented 
during these global inflationary years by increased 
export earnings from tin and crude oil as well as il-
licit dollars from the booming cocaine trade. 
Bolivia's so-called economic miracle, however, 
was short-lived. It came to an abrupt end in late 
1979, when the United States Federal Reserve 
Board, following a monetarist policy to curb infla-
tion, raised interest rates dramatically, precip-
itating the worldwide recession of 1980-1982.1 
Prices for oil and tin collapsed, private capital fled 
Bolivia, short-term foreign debts tripled between 
1980 and 1982, and Bolivia fell into a debt crisis and 
depression from which it has yet to recover. Not 
even the Bolivian military could contain the social 
unrest brought on by this economic crash, which 
manifested itself in political turmoil. The four years 
from 1978 to 1982 witnessed no less than nine heads 
of state. 
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The deteriorating economic situation - com-
bined with pressure from the international com-
munity - forced the Bolivian military to return to its 
barracks in October, 1982.2 Hernan Siles Zuazo 
and his Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP) 
coalition, which had won the 1980 election, then 
assumed power. President Siles, who had success-
fully implemented a stabilization program in 
1957-1958, was again heir to an inflationary, no-
growth economy that was not of his making. As 
economis t Jeffrey Sachs notes: 
The Siles government inherited an annual inflation 
rate of approximately 300 percent (October, 1982, 
over October, 1981), an inability to borrow on inter-
national markets, and an economy declining sharply 
in real terms (real GNP [gross national product] fell 
by 6.6 percent in 1982). At the same time, the new 
government was called upon to satisfy pent-up social 
and economic demands.' 
In an attempt to repeat his earlier historic suc-
cess, Siles implemented six price stabilization plans 
during his short term of office. They all failed 
because his government, which included Bolivian 
Communist party ministers, lacked support from 
Bolivia's businesspeople and its international credi-
tors. This lack of support led to capital flight, 
devaluation of the peso and rising prices. In a 
desperate attempt to stop the vicious spiral of deval-
uation and inflation, the Siles government ftxed 
prices, wages, interest rates and the official ex-
change rate . The result was an increase in black 
market economic transactions, which were not 
taxed, and a subsequent drop in government 
revenues . In a futile attempt to finance government 
deftcits, the Central Bank printed more and more 
money. The outcome of all these measures was the 
Bolivian hyperinflation of 1984 and 1985. 
THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
Hyperinflation forced Siles to call early elections 
in 1985 . In the elections, former General Hugo 
Banzer Suarez and his Democratic Nationalist Ac-
tion (ADN) party won a plurality of 29 percent of 
the vote. Victor Paz Estensorro of the National 
Revolutionary Movement (MNR), however, be-
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came President with only 26 percent ot the vote 
after forming an alliance with the Left Revolu-
tionary Movement (MIR) of Jaime Paz Zamora. 
Ironically, Paz Estensorro had been Bolivia's Presi-
dent during the previous period of inflation between 
1952 and 1956. 
President Paz Estensorro took office on August 6, 
1985, and proclaimed the so-called New Economic 
Policy (NEP), which included a devaluation of the 
peso and a managed floating exchange rate; a cut in 
government spending and deficits; a freeze on 
public sector wages; elimination of government 
subsidies and controls on trade and prices; and 
privatization of public enterprises. This austere In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization 
program was intended to do more than eliminate 
inflation. 
The policy succeeded in stabilizing prices, but it 
did so at a high human and social cost. Public sector 
employment decreased by 10 percent within a year, 
the peso was devalued by nearly 100 percent and in-
flation fell to an annual rate of 276 percent in 1986 
and 15 percent' in 1987. 4 In return for complying 
with the ~MF conditions, Bolivia received increased 
international financial assistance, including loans 
of $225 million from the IMF, $257 million from 
the World Bank and $351 million from the Inter-
American Development Bank. The Paris Club of 
creditor governments also permitted Bolivia to re-
schedule $2 billion in debt, and it granted Bolivia 
the unique privilege of repurchasing $450 million of 
its foreign debt owed to commercial banks at 11 
cents on the dollar, with money donated by foreign 
governments. In short, Paz Estensorro's center-
right government was handsomely rewarded. for 
returning Bolivia's economy to an open, laissez-
faire and subordinate position in the global capital-
ist community. 
Paz Estensorro's stabilization program also led to 
the privatization of the national mining company, 
Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia (Comibol) and the 
firing of 23,000 of the company's 30,000 miners. 5 
The massive unemployment of miners was only one 
'See Arthurj. Mann and Manuel Pastorjr., "Orthodox and 
Heterodox Stabilization Policies in Bolivia and Peru: 
1985-1988," Journal of Interamencan Studies and World Affairs, vol. 
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(London: Latin American Bureau, 1987). 
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Impresa Editorial Siglo Ltd., 1989). 
'Nicklas Kaldor, "Monetarism and U.K. Monetary Policy," 
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cost of this stabilization program. Unemployment 
of workers increased to an estimated 20 percent, 
real wages decreased, and rural teachers quit their 
jobs in record numbers. In compensation for their 
reduced incomes, Bolivian government ministers 
were secretly paid salaries by the United Nations. 6 
If this were not enough, the government imposed a 
10 percent value-added tax (VAT) on all economic 
transactions in mid-1986. 
Economist Nicholas Kaldor has observed that or-
thodox economic policy, like Bolivia's, 
is no more than a convenient smokescreen providing 
an ideological justification for such antisocial 
measures [as 1 high interest rates, an overvalued ex-
change rate, and the consequent diminution in the 
bargaining strength of labor due to unemployment. 7 
There are indications today that Bolivia's high in-
terest rate of 19 percent discourages real investment 
and that the "managed" peso is seriously overvalued 
by approximately 20 percent, thus reducing exports 
while promoting imports. Moreover, there is sub-
stantial evidence that the Bolivian Central Bank is 
using drug money to stabilize its finances. Short-
term (30-day) deposits in dollars and dollar-indexed 
accounts (no questions asked) increased from less 
than $28 million in September, 1985, to an esti-
mated $270 million'in March, 1987. Since then, 
dollar deposits in Bolivian banks have increased to 
about $700 million, and the economy has once 
again been "dollar stabilized." 
This stabilization, however, is not an economic 
miracle. The return of finance capital (international 
loans, debt reduction and drug money) to Bolivia 
after 1985, the freeing of prices and regressive taxes 
brought price stability to Bolivia. But the program 
has not brought prosperity or social justice to the 
country. On the contrary, inequality has increased, 
and the economy has shrunk. Nowhere is this more 
evident than on the streets of La Paz, where street 
vendors and beggars contrast with the fancy bou-
tiques, posh hotels and Mercedes-Benzes. The re-
gressive VAT absorbs nearly 15 percent of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and the high-interest 
dollar deposits discourage productive investment. 
As a result, "real per capita GDP fell by 5.6 percent 
in 1986, 0.6 percent in 1987 and 0.1 percent in 
1988."8 From 1986 to 1989, Bolivia's per capita 
GNP was only 74 percent of the per capita GNP in 
1980, and the foreign debt of$3.5 billion absorbs 30 
percent of the nation's legal export earnings. 
The MNR initially paid for the high cost of its 
price stabilization, losing heavily in the municipal 
elections of 1987 after it received only 12 percent of 
the vote. In the 1989 elections, the MNR emerged 
victorious, with its new charismatic head, Gonzolo 
("Goni") Sanchez de Lozado, winning a plurality of 
the vote, followed closely by Banzer and the ADN. 
Paz Zamora of the MIRA, who placeda weak third, 
however, was deciared President when Banzer 
swung his party's votes to paz Zamora in a congres-
sional runoff. Unofficially, it has been Banzer who 
has run the country after he acquired 50 percent (17 
portfolios) of the Cabinet in return for his votes. 
Among the portfolios held by Banzer's ADN are the 
powerful ministries of finance, defense and foreign 
affairs. 
President Jaime paz Zamora has vowed publicly 
to continue the stabilization program and to wage 
war on coca leaf producers. In return, Bolivia has 
received increased financial assistance from the 
United States. In 1989, Bolivia received $100 
million in United States aid; $15 million was ear-
marked for drug interdiction and $40 million was 
part of a coca substitution program. In 1990, 
United States aid increased to $230 million; $33.7 
million of this will go to the military if it takes part in 
the drug-eradication program. 
WAR IN BOLIVIA 
Bolivia's miners and peasants were the soldiers of 
the 1952 revolution that brought the MNR to 
power and resulted in an extensive land redistribu-
tion program. However, the MNR government 
was never comfortable with either the miners or the 
peasants of the highlands and valleys. In its 
development programs, the government heavily in-
vested in the lowlands - Santa Cruz, the Chapare 
and the Beni-where there were no unionized min-
ers or organized Amayra-Quechua peasants, and 
no land reform programs. 
After 1952, most foreign aid as well as profits 
from the state-owned Comibol mine went to the 
lowland regions. Here sugar, cotton and cattle pro-
duced on large estates promised to become the new 
base for economic development in Bolivia. The 
government's objective was to move highland 
peasants to the more fertile lowlands, put them to 
work for agro-industrial entrepreneurs, and make 
Santa Cruz and the Beni the center poles of 
development. 
Instead of sugar, cotton and cattle, however, the 
area struck it rich with coca. Today, 80 percent of 
Bolivia's coca is grown in the Chapare region, cam-
bas (Iowlanders) dominate the drug trade, and San-
ta Cruz is a cocaine boomtown. But the develop-
ment policy was a dismal failure even before coca 
arrived. Although the lowland's share of Bolivia's 
GNP increased between 1965 and 1979, agricul-
~de Franco and Ricardo Godoy, "The Economic Con-
sequences of Cocaine Produqion in Bolivia: Historical , Local, 
and Macroeconomic Perspectives," unpublished paper of the 
Harvard Institute for International Development , June 8, 
1990. 
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ture's share of GNP as a whole decreased, as did 
traditional peasant agriculture in the highlands. 
The heavily subsidized sugar crop satisfied domes-
tic consumption but not export needs. Many of the 
loans for sugarcane, cotton and cattle were unac-
counted for and became seed money for the drug· 
trafticking elites. 
The extent to which coca production and trade 
now dominate the Bolivian economy is astounding. 
Coca accounts for an estimated 30 to 40 percent of 
Bolivia's agricultural production, half its GDP and 
66 percent of its export earnings. Between 40,000 
and 70,000 peasants produce coca, and about 
500,000 Bolivians (1 in 5 of the working population) 
depend on coca for a livelihood either directly or 
through support industries. 
The typical campesino earns between $1,000 and 
$2,500 per hectare of coca plants, which is about 
four times the amount he could earn from growing 
oranges and avocados, the next most profitable al-
ternative crops. He receives $2 for a kilogram of 
coca leaf, which translates to between $70,000 and 
$90,000 per kilogram of processed pure cocaine on 
the streets in the United States. Thus, while the 
coca farmer makes a living, the cocaine trafficker 
makes a killing. 
The huge profits made from trafficking are used 
to buy airplanes, weapons, army officers and politi-
cians in Bolivia and abroad. Only one-fifth of the 
money from the Bolivian drug trade is returned to 
the country. This leaves about $2.5 billion, which is 
spent and banked abroad, mainly in the United 
States.9 
With so much money to be made in the illicit 
drug industry, the corruption of Bolivian politics is 
understandable. It reached its peak on July 17, 
1980, when General Luis Garcia Meza came to 
power in a bloody coup. Garda Meza's was un-
doubtedly the most brutal, corrupt, neo-Nazi gov-
ernment in Bolivian history. 
During the two years Garda Meza was in power, 
the United States stopped all military aid to Bolivia. 
The populist Siles government that followed was re-
luctant to accept military aid or to turn the army 
against the well-organized peasants whom Siles was 
attempting to woo as supporters. In an attempt to 
keep the military out of the drug-control business 
and at the same time convince foreign lenders that 
Bolivia was willing to cooperate in the war against 
drugs, Siles created an anti-drug police force, the 
Mobile Rural Patrol Units (UMOPAR). This 
force, which was later nicknamed the Leopards, 
was entirely trained and financed by the United 
States . But Siles's greatest fears were realized when 
the Leopards kidnapped him in an abortive coup at-
tempt inJuly, 1984. 
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This did not deter Siles's successor, Victor Paz 
Estensorro, from escalating militarization. In 
mid-1986, during Paz Estensorro's administration, 
the Leopards and 160 United States combat troops 
raided 256 suspected cocaine paste laboratories. 
They confiscated a mere 22 kilograms of the paste 
(from which cocaine is refined) and arrested only 
one narcotrafficker - a peasant worker. The opera-
tion, dubbed "Blast Furnace," was a failure in still 
another respect. Bolivian society was outraged at 
the government's unconstitutional use of foreign 
troops without congressional approval. 
Paz Estensorro soon focused his drug-eradication 
program on two fronts: armed conflict against the 
peasant coca producers and a program that paid 
$2,000 for each hectare of coca plants "voluntarily" 
destroyed. Both programs are financed by the 
United States government. 
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
On February 15, 1990, the Presidents of the 
United States, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia met in 
Cartagena, Colombia, to set policy for the drug 
war. They agreed "to implement or strengthen a 
comprehensive, intensified anti-narcotics program" 
to reduce both the supply of and the demand for il-
legal drugs. 
On May 9, 1990, the United States and Bolivia 
signed an agreement that commits the Bolivian 
armed forces to fight the drug war. Under this 
agreement, $33.7 million in United States aid will 
be distributed in 1990 to eradicate drugs. In 1991 
the drug-eradication and coca-substitution aid 
package is expected to total $95.8 million. 10 
Despite this massive infusion of money and man-
power, no one can seriously claim that the war on 
drugs in Bolivia is being won. Bolivia eradicated 
between 6,500 and 8,000 hectares of coca leaves in 
late 1990, although it was scheduled to destroy only 
6,000 hectares for the entire year. However, Bolivia 
produces between 50,000 and 100,000 hectares of 
coca, which means that at the present rate of de-
struction, it will take at least 6 to 12 years to 
eliminate Bolivia's existing coca crop-if no new 
production is undertaken. And the costs of relocat-
ing and compensating coca producers could be as 
much as $3.5 billion. The Bolivian peasant will 
most likely continue to produce coca as long as de-
mand in the United States or in other developed 
countries remains high or until viable alternative 
cash crops are developed at home. 
The battle against cocaine traffickers is making 
little progress. On December 10, 1989, Colonel 
·Luis Arce Gomez, Garda Meza's minister of in-
H'''Bolivia Seeks U.S. Aid to Strengthen Its Economy," Chris-
tian Scimee Monilor, February 15, 1990, p. 3. 
terior, was apprehended and extradited to the 
United States to face drug charges. He faced similar 
charges in the Bolivian courts. Erl<in Echeverra, 
Arce Gomez's right-hand man, was recently ab-
ducted and extradited to the United States and has 
reportedly agreed to testify against his former boss. 
Meco Dominguez, one of Bolivia's top three drug 
traffickers, was also apprehended. 
The arrests of these Bolivian druglords are only 
the tip of the iceberg. General Garda Meza still 
draws his military pension, and his case in the 
Bolivian Supreme Court drags on. Banzer has been 
neither arrested nor charged and remains the head 
of Bolivia's major political party and the recognized 
power behind President Paz Zamora. 
Corruption is most evident in the banking sys-
tem, where "cocaine stabilization" is the norm. 
Most Bolivian drug money is laundered in the in-
ternational banking system, which includes United 
States and Panamanian banks. The largest private 
bank in Bolivia, the Santa Cruz Bank, has offices in 
Panama and Miami. 
Drug launderers and their bankers, however, are 
not targets of the military in its brave new drug war. 
Drug money is withdrawn from Bolivian banks 
whenever the government takes action against the 
druglords or when they do not support or cannot 
control the government. This capital is repatriated 
when the druglords feel safe or when they support 
the government, which has been the case in Bolivia 
since 1985. 
The drug money deposits and repatriation ex-
plain why Bolivia's currency and price levels have 
stabilized since 1985. This policy obviously serves 
the interests of the new illegitimate bourgeoisie and 
the "narco-generals" of Bolivia. It also apparently 
serves the United States national interest, inas-
much as money laundering has not only been toler-
ated by the United States but has, in fact, been en-
couraged. The latest program to privatize Bolivia's 
public enterprises is a case in point. 
There is little doubt that much of the investment 
capital used by Bolivia's new entrepreneurs is drug 
money. Privatization will further legitimize cocaine 
profits and make respectable businesspeople of the 
(Continued on page 90) 
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(Continued from page 68) 
Bolivian cocaine traffickers. This is not a bad policy 
in the long run. But drug trafficking is much more 
profitable than running an airline or a brewery. 
Bolivia's druglords thus may not abandon their il-
legitimate drug trade but simply use the privatized 
companies as new fronts for money laundering. 
While the drug traffickers face the prospect of 
acquiring respectability and legitimacy, the poor 
peasant coca growers struggle to survlve agamst the 
combined armed might of the United States and 
Bolivian militaries . In November, 1990, 1,600 
combat regulars of the Bolivian army were ordered 
to the Chapare to wage war against the coca grow-
ers . Bolivia's peasants will undoubtedly resist this 
repression as did the Bolivian miners before them . 
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